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n many countries, improvised explosive devices (IED), in-

the common scenarios of use, and the implications of imple-

cluding improvised landmines, now constitute more of a

menting IED awareness for both the civilian population and

threat to civilians than factory-manufactured landmines

the organization itself.2 However, the risk assessment should

and other conventional weapons. The Landmine and Cluster

also present concrete risk-mitigation strategies. Moreover, due

Munition Monitor 2016 reported that the total number of ca-

to the complexities created by dynamic conflicts, risk assess-

sualties from victim-operated IEDs, which act in a similar

ments need to be made at regional or local levels in order to
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be relevant. The Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining

to 1,331 in 2015, the highest annual total of IED casualties re-

Group (DRC/DDG) has designed such a risk assessment pro-

corded since 1999.1 In response to this, humanitarian mine

cess that is proposed as a framework for the drafting of a

action organizations are expanding their scope of activities

Technical Note on Mine Action in support of references to

to include IED awareness for civilians either as a stand-alone

IEDs within International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

activity or by integrating messages on IEDs into traditional
mine risk education (MRE) sessions. This article explores the
protection concerns related to the conduct of any educational
activities on IEDs, with a particular focus on south-central
Somalia. The article also discusses the challenges that exist
for humanitarian organizations to successfully plan and implement IED awareness while upholding the principle of “do
no harm.” Furthermore, the article argues that there is a need
to recognize that educational activities related to IEDs must
be approached with methodologies, messages, and materials
specific to these devices, as opposed to simply copying those

Analysis of the Situation in South-Central Somalia
In south-central Somalia, IEDs are actively being deployed
by armed opposition groups, such as Harakaat al-Shabaab
al-Mujaahidiin, as well as by criminal gangs and during inter\militant conflict.3 These weapons bring the time, place, and
method of attack fully under the operator’s control, hence
the high prevalence of use. There are very few cases of legacy devices because unused devices that did not detonate are
typically retrieved and employed elsewhere.4 Humanitarian
organizations looking into the feasibility of conducting IED

that are considered to be effective for MRE.

awareness in south-central Somalia should be cognizant of the

Importance of Risk Assessments

flict but a tool actively used by armed opposition groups to

fact that, in this context, IEDs are not the after-effects of con-
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destabilize and attack the state.5 Any organization getting in-

reduce civilian casualties. However, a thorough risk assess-

volved in this issue, regardless of altruistic intentions, risks
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IED awareness and ensuring that they significantly outweigh
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the potential associated risks. This is due to the fact that IED
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awareness has the potential to create serious protection issues

Data available from January to July 2016 demonstrates that

for the civilian population, many of which are outlined in the
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rest of the article. There is also a risk that organizations will
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be seen as taking sides in the conflict. Therefore, a thorough
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risk assessment is a key decision-making tool to help organi-

known. The high percentage of devices listed as unknown is

zations understand the status of the device, the typical target,

due to the challenges posed to carrying out post-blast forensic
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IED (RCIED) exploded as a police vehicle passed it near the

Victim-operated
4%

Black Sea neighborhood in Mogadishu on 11 November 2016.8
Armed opposition groups (AOG) commonly use IEDs to
target representatives of the international community, particularly the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the
United Nations, and other representatives of the diplomatic
community. In these cases, they are targeted because they are
perceived as supporting the Federal Government of Somalia
and therefore are not considered to have a neutral or impartial status, or—in the case of AMISOM—because they active-

Command-detonated
40%

Unknown
56%

ly engaged in combat against al-Shabaab. A recent example is
an attack that targeted AMISON troops in El-Ade in January
2016. The incident began with the detonation of a VBIED followed by al-Shabaab fighters storming the base.9 Additionally,
twin VBIED attacks were carried out near the airport in
Mogadishu in July 2016 and reportedly killed ten people; the
attack was claimed by the spokesperson of al-Shabaab to have
targeted the headquarters of the African Union force.10
In 2015, there were 887 IED casualties in south-central

Figure 1. 2016 IED snapshot: South-central Somalia.
Figure courtesy of the author.

investigations at the explosion sites, and it also highlights the

Somalia, 454 (51 percent) of which were civilians.11 Research
indicates that in the majority of cases, civilian casualties are
simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, caught in the

difficulty of compiling accurate data on types of IEDs used.
It should be noted that Somalia is following the IEDs evolution trend, as was seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, with predictable increases in device complexity and explosive charge size.6
However, Somalia is distinct from other countries due to the
fact that a significant proportion of IEDs encountered in those
countries are VOIEDs.
Overwhelmingly, IED attacks in south-central Somalia target government agencies and representatives such as security
personnel or government officials. The majority of IED attacks target locations where government or security service
personnel work, such as the July 2016 attack on the Criminal
Investigation Department (CID) building in Mogadishu, and
the two attacks on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu where the
government often hosts major conferences.7 Incidents involving high-profile targets are typically complex attacks where
vehicle-born IEDs (VBIED) or suicide VBIEDs (SVBIED) are
used to initiate the attack, which is immediately followed by
gunmen who wear suicide vests, also known as person-borne
IEDs (PBIED). Complex attacks are also a tactic to intimidate
the local population by showing that al-Shabaab can strike
wherever and whenever they like, including in areas that are
officially under the control of the Federal Government of
Somalia. In addition, roadside IEDs are used to target military and police convoys, such as when a remote-controlled
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The Ambassador Hotel.
All photos courtesy of UNMAS Somalia.

initial blast or during the subsequent armed attack, such as
when a roadside IED near Lafole town killed 18 civilians traveling in a mini-bus that was escorted by a vehicle carrying
government troops.12 In addition, there are increasing examples of deliberate attacks on public places that are considered
too western and liberal, such as the three attacks on restaurants at Lido Beach in Mogadishu in 2016.
Gathering Information for IED Awareness
With civilians in south-central Somalia representing 51
percent of the casualties from IEDs in 2015, the protection
implications of this are significant in Somalia. There is certainly a strong argument for further research into what could
be done to provide civilians with the knowledge and skills to
avoid being caught up in an IED attack. While many recognize that designing and implementing an effective educational program requires a thorough needs assessment to make
informed programming decisions, this is problematic in the
case of IED awareness.13 There are many risks associated with
data-gathering on an active IED threat that do not apply to
factory-manufactured mines or explosive remnants of war
(ERW). This raises important questions from a protection
perspective.
In the context of south-central Somalia, information gathering on vulnerabilities at the community level to an active
IED threat is extremely sensitive and likely to be perceived
by the local population as intelligence gathering on behalf of
government or security forces. The perception that humanitarian organizations are affiliated with the government would
call into question the neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization involved and could result in the
organization and its staff being considered as legitimate targets for attack by AOGs. Humanitarian organizations should
also be sensitive to the fact that, at this point, the IED threat
in south-central Somalia is dealt with almost exclusively by
state entities, which include the police, military, and intelligence services. Consequently, despite altruistic and protective
intentions, efforts by international organizations to gather
information on these issues are likely to be treated with suspicion and even hostility by state actors.14 At the community

The Nasa Hablood Hotel.

this context, DRC/DDG believes that employing participatory
approaches to needs assessments—for example carrying out
key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and individual interviews with members of affected communities—has
the potential to do great harm not only to the humanitarian
organization but also to the beneficiary community. Hence,
developing new methodologies and tools for analyzing the
vulnerabilities of the civilian population to IEDs is prudent,
and mine action organizations should avoid relying on those
that have been used for traditional MRE needs assessments.
Implementing the IED Risk Education
Awareness Campaign

level, anyone who is known or suspected to have provided in-

If moving forward with an IED awareness campaign, orga-

formation as part of such an assessment could be viewed as an

nizations would do well to approach south-central Somalia’s

informant. Considering that IED facilitators, as well as silent

situation with methodologies, messages, and materials that

supporters of al-Shabaab live within the communities, there

are specific to IEDs as opposed to those that are effective for

is a very real threat of retribution at the community level.15

traditional MRE.16 First and foremost, pictures of IEDs serve

This analysis raises questions on whether it is possible to

little purpose due to the fact that the manner in which IEDs

carry out information gathering on IEDs in south-central

are deployed implies that they remain hidden or disguised. If

Somalia while upholding the principle of “do no harm.” In

information regarding the appearance of IEDs or the context
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where they are placed is disseminated in communities, the

civilians come across a suspected IED, are in the proximity of

groups that fabricate these weapons will potentially react by

an explosion, or are caught in gunfire following an explosion.

changing the devices’ appearance, components, and locations.

Asking the civilian population to “report” IEDs in a context

Another risk involved in using pictures of IEDs is that every-

like south-central Somalia is inappropriate.

thing could potentially look like an IED. This would inevitably
contribute to an unnecessary fear of everyday objects among
the civilian population and intensify the psychological suffering already experienced by the Somali population.

Looking Toward the Future
This article (1) explores the concerns relating to any educational activities on IEDs for the civilian population, with

Similarly, while significant work was done to develop

a particular focus on south-central Somalia. This article also

IED awareness curricula for military personnel deployed in

discusses (2) the challenges that exist for humanitarian or-

conf lict-affected environments, this information may not

ganizations wishing to plan and implement IED awareness

be appropriate for civilian audiences. For military person-

successfully whilst upholding the principle of “do no harm.”

nel, IED awareness may delve into detail of how an IED is

Furthermore, the article argues that (3) there is a need to rec-

constructed and deployed, which is intended to supplement

ognize that civilian-focused educational activities on IEDs

what they know about tactics, techniques, and procedures.

must be approached with methodologies, materials, and mes-

This is reminiscent of the early days of mine action, when

sages specific to these devices.

beneficiaries were provided with irrelevant information,

The case of south-central Somalia is used to highlight the

e.g., the name of the weapon, the amount of explosive inside,

fact that despite the high number of civilian casualties and the

and the functioning principle by which the mine operated.

altruistic intentions behind engaging in IED awareness, if ap-

In the case of landmines and ERW, these unnecessary de-

propriate risk-mitigation strategies are not in place, related

tails were eventually deemed inappropriate and discarded.

activities have the potential to do real and long-lasting harm

However, at this stage, the humanitarian community pres-

to organizations and beneficiaries. As a result, supplementing

ently runs the risk of repeating the same mistakes in ad-

the necessary tools and best practices in dealing with IEDs is

dressing IED-related threats.

vital for the safety and effectiveness of mine action work in

Humanitarian organizations who share this level of detail

current conflict environments. A new Technical Note on

with civilian audiences in south-central Somalia may inad-

Mine Action is a sound first step in this direction; however, to

vertently encourage people to approach suspected IEDs or,

ensure that they “do no harm” the issue will require organiza-

worse still, try to move them to protect others. Moreover,

tions to proceed with caution.
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experience from counter-IED efforts illustrate that IED users regularly adapt their emplacement or targeting methods
to thwart counter-IED measures.18 The implication of this for
IED awareness is that materials and messages could quickly
become irrelevant as the nature of IEDs evolve. Finally, if humanitarian organizations are seen disseminating information
on how to make IEDs and how they work at the communitylevel, serious questions may be asked by the host government
as to the purpose of educating people on this.
All educational activities on IEDs for civilians in southcentral Somalia should therefore focus on what the civilian
population needs to know, which is distinctly different from
that of military personnel. IED awareness at the communitylevel must emphasize improving situational awareness and
the ability to recognize the IED indicators as well as those
of an imminent attack. Depending on the results of the risk
assessment, sessions could elaborate on the typical scenarios in which civilians become casualties and on what to do if
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